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Million of wireless device users are ever on the move, be-
coming more dependent on their PDAs, smart phones,
and other handheld devices. With the advancement of
pervasive computing, new and unique capabilities are
available to aid mobile societies. The wireless nature of
these devices has fostered a new era of mobility. Thou-
sands of pervasive devices are able to arbitrarily join and
leave a network, creating a nomadic environment known
as a pervasive ad hoc network. However, mobile devices
have vulnerabilities, and some are proving to be challeng-
ing. Security in pervasive computing is the most critical
challenge. Security is needed to ensure exact and accurate
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and access con-
trol, to name a few. Security for mobile devices, though
still in its infancy, has drawn the attention of various re-
searchers. As pervasive devices become incorporated in
our day-to-day lives, security will increasingly becoming
a common concern for all users - - though for most it will
be an afterthought, like many other computing functions.
The usability and expansion of pervasive computing ap-
plications depends greatly on the security and reliability
provided by the applications. At this critical juncture,
security research is growing. This paper examines the re-
cent trends and forward thinking investigation in several
fields of security, along with a brief history of previous
accomplishments in the corresponding areas. Some open
issues have been discussed for further investigation.
Keywords: Pervasive security, privacy, security, and
trust
1 Introduction
The importance of security has been supported with thou-
sands of recent surveys, and it is far beyond an af-
terthought nowadays. Network security has topped the
priority list of 47% respondents in the Networking Re-
port Card survey by SearchNetworking.com [65]. Closely
related to security are issues of corporate reputation, com-
petitive position, and monetary gain. A study by eMar-
keter indicates an average loss of $10 billion per year due
to infractions in computer security [66]. Microsoft has
defined security as “The protection of information assets
through the use of technology, processes, and training”
[63]. Wikipedia defines security as a “... platform, de-
signed so that agents (users or programs) can only per-
form actions that have been allowed. This involves spec-
ifying and implementing a security policy” [64]. CIA
(Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) is the term com-
monly used to describe the required characteristics of se-
curity. Confidentiality ensures information is not exposed
to any unauthorized user. Integrity indicates information
has not been altered or falsified by an unauthorized user.
Availability denotes information is readily available when
required.
Security in pervasive computing has been termed per-
vasive security. Though pervasive security includes all
the characteristics and requirements of computer secu-
rity, it introduces some novel vulnerabilities and security
rifts due to a few unique characteristics of pervasive com-
puting. Pervasive computing has been defined as “Nu-
merous, casually accessible, often invisible computing de-
vices, frequently mobile or embedded in the environment,
connected to an increasingly ubiquitous network infras-
tructure composed of a wired core and wireless edges”
[67]. Pervasive computing is the brain child of Weiser
[69]. This vision embeds computation into the environ-
ment and ensures transparent interaction of these compu-
tational devices with the users. It can be considered the
opposite of virtual reality.
Pervasive computing is proving its usability and scope
in almost every aspect nowadays. The availability of,
and tremendous improvement in, pervasive devices in-
cluding PDAs, smart phones, tiny sensors, etc., have
made this next generation of computing technology suit-
able for many situations in places like the home, hospital,
or battlefield. Recent surveys like [26] indicate 50% of
physicians used PDAs in 2002, [1] and they were used by
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approximately 50% of people in the U.S., indicating the
tremendous growth in the use handheld computers and
pervasive devices. To overcome several constraints re-
lated to capability, pervasive devices actually form a col-
laborative space where devices are highly inter-connected
and mutually cooperative; this becomes the key to success
and leads to sharing of resources and information. The
downside is that this provides opportunities for theft and
hacking. The characteristics of pervasive scenarios some-
times seem to provide an open invitation for active and
passive eavesdroppers. In order to increase the usability
and spectrum range of scenarios that can benefit from this
technique, pervasive computing has yet to prove it is up
to solving the security challenges.
As devices can join and leave completely arbitrarily,
they form an extremely volatile ad hoc network which is
changing from time to time. Thus, we cannot rely on a
static, permanent security model. A solution is to invoke
a dynamic security system with sufficient intelligence to
prevent security breaches. In order to grow this intel-
ligence, a system should avail itself of several types of
private information. Some contextual information that
carries importance in pervasive security are:
1) Security policy of the host: Each user has some
personalized rules for access control of varying re-
sources as well as the visibility.
2) Security policy of the resource/system: This
includes the details of policies under which a resource
can be accessed in a specific scenario.
3) Location: The situational information for both the
user and resource is very important. A resource may
declare some specific trusted locations as a precon-
dition for getting the service. A resource may be
accessed by remote users whereas others might have
access restricted to their own domain.
4) Methodology for connection: This contextual in-
formation include a connection mechanism and its
security, bandwidth, packet routing information, etc.
It also includes information about the devices being
used in communication between the user and the per-
vasive environment.
5) Interaction methodology of the host: A host
may be able to access a specific resource in one situ-
ation while fail to access the same resource in other
scenario, due to change in his/her participation in a
different activity or role.
Security in pervasive computing actually spreads over
a broad sphere, encompassing a large number of issues
including security in authentication, authorization, and
access control. We divided these issues into several sec-
tions and tried to provide a brief history along with the
present trend in each corresponding field. We have tried
to cover all recent research in related to security. The
open issues section has been attached to provide further
research directions.
Section 2 describes several security models, some of
which have incorporated agents. As agents are taking the
place of actors in many scenarios with perfection these
models have become attractive. Authentication and au-
thorization perform the key roles in ensuring security,
which has been described in Section 3. After authoriza-
tion, the next question is the right to access a specific
facility. Focus of Section 4 is on access control which
deals with access right, feedback, etc. A user may em-
ploy any pervasive application to get some kind of service
which is generally provided through the discovery of re-
sources. This issue has been discussed in Section 5. The
issue of trust depicted in Section 6 is actually inseparably
related to all subsections of security. Section 7 puts for-
ward some open discussions and issues, which are followed
by our conclusions in Section 8.
2 Security Model
Several works exist where agent-based applications have
proved to be promising. Some projects have come up
with different security issues in Mobile Agent System. In
order to prevent malicious use [21], it is suggested that
agents should communicate only with trusted and authen-
ticated nodes. Hence several trust models appear which
we discuss later. A scenario is described [50] where the
credibility of a node will vary depending on the agents’
interaction with that node. [37] describes a method to
defend against several types of attacks and to restrict an
agent from occupying a specific resource for a long time.
In a recent interesting study [20], the researchers pro-
posed a security model named ‘QED’ (Quarantine, Ex-
amination and Decontamination). QED was designed to
provide several aspects of security which are well known
for fixed infrastructures within the realm of a pervasive
computing environment – virus scan, firewall, intrusion
detection, and update and patch management. As part
of an examination phase, the QED model incorporates a
fixed infrastructure based security nodes which can pro-
vide updated virus scanners and patches. These nodes
are seeking permission to enter in the network, and QED
can push the nodes to receive the updated information as
a precondition for entrance. The Quarantine phase per-
forms the isolation of clients to ensure that they meet the
local integrity constraints. On the other hand, the device
can also decide not to access some of the available services
of the network due to conflict with its own access pol-
icy. Clients are checked for potential vulnerabilities and
malicious code in the Examination period. The proba-
ble investigations include virus scans and memory scans.
During an active examination, clients need to go through
all the defined investigations, whereas in passive investi-
gation the system acknowledges a digital certificate that
ensures that the corresponding client have passed similar
checks in the previous environment. The Decontamina-
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tion phase deals with removing vulnerabilities from the
examined clients. Several tools can be used for this phase.
At present, we have observed many agent-based per-
vasive computing applications. [46] discusses several di-
mensions of security for a specific environment named
Multi Agent System (MAS). It also represents a security
model named Buddy where a security feature has been
distributed among all the nodes and each node tries to
safeguard its neighbor. In contrast with many others, here
the authors proposed a non-hierarchical implementation
and mentioned that hierarchical models are more likely to
be attacked by a malefic force. According to the authors,
if a specific agent or group of agents maintain the secu-
rity features in hierarchical architecture, it is much easier
to locate and penetrate them. In the Buddy model, each
agent records the presence of its closest neighbor or buddy
through a token passing mechanism. When facing dan-
ger, each agent will seek help from its buddy. Each agent
acts once as ‘Token Sender’ and once as ‘Token Receiver’.
When an agent receives a token in a predefined time limit,
it gets the idea that its buddy is in good shape. Other-
wise it senses a problem and broadcasts a global message
to identify the problem. Each agent in the topology gets
a chance to periodically broadcast. TokenSender and To-
kenReceiver classes of Java have been used to implement
the scenario.
The researchers in [5, 7] have proposed a new architec-
ture named Ubiquitous Mobile Agent System (UbiMAS)
where they have shown some unique security characteris-
tics. Here the agent contains all the personal information
and can request a service on behalf of the user. Finally, it
actually accompanies the corresponding mobile user as he
travels across different environments and domains. The
system incorporates two types of agents, user agent and
service agent. The system architecture operates in the
following manner: A Message Delivery Engine deals with
message delivery to and from agents. If the message is
destined to an agent that resides in the current node then
the message is passed to the PoBox. PoBox maintains
a PoBox Adder and a queue for each agent connected
with the agent node. PoBox Adder maintains the com-
munication link between an agent and agent node. Using
PoBox Adder and the queue, the system can ensure se-
curity in message transfer and protect itself from several
attacks including DoS attack. The agent node can issue
a timer that can dynamically change the length of the
queue which facilitates the security features. If the Mes-
sage Delivery Engine finds that the destined agent is not
in the current node, it then forwards the message to the
required node. An agent can migrate from one node to
another using the Migration Engine and Serializer / Dese-
rializer component. While sending messages from agents
or nodes, the Message Delivery Engine performs packet
formatting, inclusion of header, and other required secu-
rity operations. Acknowledgement has been introduced
to guarantee against packet loss. All the messages are
sent in encrypted form. The security features enable the
system to protect the agents from hosts as well as both
agents and hosts from malicious agents. UbiMAS has
been developed in Java as a service that runs on top of a
middleware named Autonomic Middleware for Ubiquitous
eNvironments (AMUN) [61].
3 Authentication and Authoriza-
tion
Authentication and authorization have long been dis-
cussed in pervasive computing. Both features are needed,
in order to restrict any malicious user from entering the
network or to prove one’s own identity. These issues have
gained paramount importance over several aspects of se-
curity. Starting from Active Badge System [8] in 1994
several authentication systems were proposed for differ-
ent ad hoc situations based on identity [16, 68], proximity
[6, 19], private-public key combination [6, 17], reputation
[57], trust [44], etc.
Authors in [73] present an authorization mechanism
based on context awareness. Several other applications
can cope with this mechanism without any difficulty as
it incorporates GSSAPI (Generic Security Services Ap-
plication Program Interface-RFC 2743) through the well
known technology Kerberos. Here the authors used con-
textual information of different roles in generating a sim-
pler access control policy. The whole architecture in-
cludes authentication service, authorization service, dy-
namic context services provided through dynamic context
service manager (DCSM), dynamic context update mech-
anism and event update mechanism. Kerberos, LDAP
and XML have been thoroughly used in building the au-
thentication architecture. These open protocols increase
the operability of the architecture over several platforms.
This architecture can also function on LINUX. Kerberos
protocol provides the cryptographic technique required
for authentication and LDAP supports the required stor-
age. Two types of roles, standard role and task, have been
specified in the authorization service. Dynamic Context
Service Manager (DCSM) deals with the responsibility of
activating and deactivating these roles based on the con-
textual constraints. Dynamic Context Service (DCS) is
responsible for collecting context data and providing the
information to DCSM based on a predefined policy. This
policy specifies the frequency for collecting contextual in-
formation, threshold values for various events that indi-
cate when to apprize DCSM about those events, etc. Dy-
namic Context Update Mechanism modifies and updates
a current contextual information object when it receives
such a request from DCS or authorization services as a
result of activation/deactivation.
In a research paper from Dartmouth College [40], re-
searchers present a context aware authorization mecha-
nism based on rules and facts. This rule-based authoriza-
tion differs from others in that it does not need any central
server or certificate authority (CA) which will be trusted
by all and will store all the contextual information. In
this method, when a user wants to acquire a service from
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a resource/server, that server issues a logical authentica-
tion query and sends it to the host of the resource. Each
host has a knowledge domain with which it attempts to
prove the authorization query. If it fails, it distributes
several portions of the proof to multiple hosts. Through
this distribution, the computational overhead is actually
reduced. After getting the sub-proofs from co-hosts, the
host of the resource can declare the result of the query to
be TRUE or FALSE, thus indicating grant or denial of ac-
cess. By design, this approach facilitates confidentiality,
integrity and scalability. In the architecture of the host,
the ‘Query Handler’ deals with the remote request and
ensures personal confidentiality rules. The ‘Query Issuer’
takes the responsibility of passing request for sub-proofs
to other hosts and enforces personal integrity issues. The
‘Interference Engine’ attempts to compose the proof tree
based on the rules and facts available in its knowledge
domain. XProloga of Java has been used in building the
prototype that evaluates the authorization query.
In the Gaia Authentication [11] the authors incorpo-
rates a number of authentication means where each au-
thentication mechanism attains a specific value known as
a ‘confidence value’. This value ranges from 0 to 1 depend-
ing on the device and protocol used in the authentication
process. In order to increase the confidence value, a spe-
cific authentication mechanism may include any number
of authentication processes. Reasoning technique is used
to formulate the net confidence value from the partial con-
fidence values. This authentication provides a unique fea-
ture which decouples the authentication procedures and
authentication devices into two sections. The Authentica-
tion Mechanism Module (AMM) encompasses all the au-
thentication procedures available like challenge-response,
Kerberos, SESAME [35] etc. The Authentication Device
Module (ADM) incorporates a module for each authenti-
cation device like PDA, smart badge, etc., and these mod-
ules are device dependent. This decoupling facilitates the
incorporation of a new protocol in the AMM section or
a new module in the ADM section for a new authentica-
tion device without interacting with the other section. In
order to ensure lightweight CORBA services, universally
Interoperable Core (UIC) has been used.
Style of authentication sometimes varies based on the
situation. Authors in [6] have presented an authentica-
tion mechanism based on the proximity of the user. This
protocol has been implemented in a hospital scenario us-
ing several components. In this context aware system,
a JavaCard has been used to contain the identity infor-
mation of the user including an id, password and a pair
of secret and public keys. In order to incorporate con-
text awareness, the system encompasses context moni-
tors and context servers. The context aware infrastruc-
ture mainly provides location information. If both the
identification and context aware system fail for some un-
known reason, the entire system returns to the manual
username/password system to ensure security. The au-
thenticity of the entire system depends critically on the
accuracy of the location identification. The authors also
analyze several types of passive and active attacks and
their impact on the system.
In [2] authors have gone through several authentication
mechanisms and a number of categorizations of the sys-
tems have been provided based on different classification
criterions.
4 Access Control
Many projects and frameworks have dealt with the mech-
anism of access control and related security issues. In
1996, a protocol named PolicyMaker [9] was implemented
with options for setting policies and providing access right
queries. Then a new model Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) [38, 39] gained popularity that defined access
based on the role of the user. Though this model tries
to secure the system from unauthorized users based on
this theme, sometimes it becomes very difficult to define
roles for every user. Later several researchers proposed
a central knowledge base for access control mechanism in
their projects [13, 15, 41].
In pervasive ad hoc scenarios, information are collected
and stored in different ways through different devices in
different environments. This becomes nearly impossible if
the owner of the information has to grant separate access
based on client, situation, category of information, etc.
There have already been addressed to reduce the number
of access right permissions like RBAC (Role Based Access
Control), sharing of access right strategies over multiple
domains, etc. Here the authors focus on information re-
lationship and place this as a new axis for limiting the
issue of access rights. The information relationship has
been classified in to three categories: 1. Bundling based,
2. Combination based, and 3. Granularity based. Access
rights are stored as SPKI/SDSI digital certificates [18]
in the corresponding client rather than storing all access
rights in a central server, thus ensuring the required dis-
tributed approach. Whenever a client receives an access
right, it stores the right and corresponding information
relationship. Later when the client seeks to access a dif-
ferent resource, the stored access rights and information
relationships are used to build a proof for that access, and
permission will be granted if he succeeds in building the
proof. Thus this methodology will reduce the interaction
with the owner of the information in issuing access rights.
The conditions needed for access rights have been formal-
ized. Java has been used in building the framework. The
facility of proving access rights have been incorporated in
the framework provided by Howell and Kotz [30]. Access
right proofs have been built as Java classes. This proto-
col implementation has used the CSI (Contextual Service
Interface) [32] of the well-known Aura project [23] as a
test bed.
If a user is denied access to any event, the user should
receive specific feedback information based on the refusal.
The pervasive computing environment involves thousands
of scenarios as well as a dynamic access control policy that
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changes based on various contextual information such as
role of the user, activity, and time. As a result, the same
user might be initially granted access to a particular ser-
vice and then be refused at other times thus causing con-
fusion for the user. Consequently, merely showing a sim-
ple message ‘Access Denied’ is not enough from the users’
perspective. Being inspired by this scenario, some re-
searcher in Urbana-Champaign have proposed a feedback
model named ‘Know’ [36] that provides an optimal alter-
native solution. When access to a particular service is
made available, it simultaneously ensures that system’s
security and access control policy is not being disclosed.
The feedback information certainly increases the usabil-
ity and reliability of the system but there has to be a
trade off between quality and quantity of feedback and
disclosure of access control policies. First, OBDD (Or-
dered Binary Decision Diagram) is used to construct a
graph structure. The goal is to start from the root and
reach a leaf node marked as TRUE. Each edge denotes a
condition. A cost function which is based on activities,
roles and meta policies is defined to identify a weight for
a specific edge. Then a shortest path algorithm is used to
find a path from the root to a TRUE leaf node that con-
sumes the minimum cost. In order to protect meta data,
the corresponding edges are assigned an infinite value. As
a result these paths will never be chosen as a solution and
the feedback information will not contain any informa-
tion about the access control policy. The portal provides
the feedback information only if it can calculate an alter-
native solution within predefined constraints of time and
space. As a first step OBDD is generated based on several
access conditions. BuDDy [45] library is used to optimize
the initial OBDD. This prototype has been implemented
in the Gaia project [53].
5 Secure Resource Discovery
Service or resource discovery is one of the main features
of pervasive applications. If security is not employed
with certainty when discovering and achieving services,
active and passive intruders can enjoy unauthorized ser-
vices and there is a possibility of even corrupting the ser-
vice provider. In 1999 the Ninja project [24, 25] was im-
plemented in UC Berkeley. It developed the concept of
secure identification of service through Secure Service Dis-
covery Service (SSDS). Here Certificate Authority (CA)
deals with issuing valid certificates and Capability Man-
ager plays an important role in enforcing security where
capabilities indicate the access permission of a user to a
set of resources. The service providers can also mention
the required conditions (capabilities) that a user needs
to obtain in order to discover a particular service. Some
of the service discovery projects enforced an encryption
technique whereas some imposed a simplified version of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [62].
In [14] the authors provided a survey on the available
security issues in some of the well-known Service Oriented
Architectures (SOA) along with some required issues in
designing secure Service Oriented Architectures. Litera-
ture on the security aspects of several standard protocols
like UPnP (Universal Plug and Play), Jini, Bluetooth,
Salutation architecture, Service Location Protocol (SLP)
have been analyzed along with some recent architectures
like Ninja project [4], Splendor [74] etc. Besides some
general aspects like authentication or authorization, re-
searchers have proposed four service oriented issues that
are needed to be taken care of from the point of view of
security.
1) Service Registration and Deregistration has to be
done before indicating that a specific service is avail-
able. At the same time, registered services have to
maintain their integrity.
2) Secure Discovery indicates that there has to be a se-
curity mechanism which ensures that services will
be available only to valid clients. While a client is
requesting a service, the system may need to regu-
late the flow of information including type of service,
owner of the service, etc.
3) At this step ‘Secure Delivery’ ensures that the service
requested by the user will be provided to him in the
required manner. That means the service, on the way
to the client, should be secure from any counterfeiting
or tampering.
4) Availability indicates that the system should always
have an updated list of available registered services,
which will be provided if an authorized user requests
for that service maintaining all the rules and restric-
tions.
Smith [60] focuses on a context aware discovery of re-
sources and how to access resources in a secure and unob-
trusive manner. In a pervasive computing environment,
rules and limitations imposed by the user, the system,
and the collaborative activity scenario have to be com-
bined dynamically at runtime. Here the researchers have
defined a namespace related to each user and domain.
These namespaces include resources, services and activ-
ities. The binding protocol defines the association of a
user to a specific resource in the space. This protocol will
dynamically adapt itself based on the contextual infor-
mation of the user including the location, activity, and
role, to name a few. A descriptor is associated with each
namespace that encompasses functional attributes repre-
sented in WSDL (Web Services Description Language)
and RDF (Resource Description Framework), conditions
for security, and policies for binding protocol. The bind-
ing protocol specifies whether the binding of a resource
is ‘shared’ or ‘private’ and whether the binding is ‘per-
manent’ or ‘context-based’. In the architecture, the ‘con-
text manager’ provides the necessary contexts to the ‘view
manager’ which is responsible for updating the ‘view’ that
will be visible to the user based on this contextual infor-
mation. Along with the context aware security model, the
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research provides a role based model to specify different
activities in a pervasive computing environment.
As an extension of the project Centaurus [33, 34], re-
searchers at the University of Maryland in Baltimore have
presented Centaurus2 [62] that provides a secure mecha-
nism for service discovery. It also enables the users to
access services across heterogeneous network domains. In
order to achieve the required security features like au-
thentication and authorization with minimum interaction
with the user, the system incorporates a modified sim-
ple version of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Here each
entity has to be registered in the system. The Certifi-
cate Authority (CA) issues a certificate to each identified
and verified entity. Smart Cards are used to store the
digital certificates. It also contains the private key of the
clients thus providing security into the functionality of the
clients. PKCS #11 is used to contain the private keys of
computing components like service managers and capa-
bility managers. The design of Centaurus2 encompasses
five vital computational components:
1) The Certificate Authority is responsible for issuing
digital certificates and for providing replies to the
queries asking for validation of digital certificates.
2) The Communication Manager deals with the commu-
nication and interaction between clients and services.
The communication is independent of protocol and
medium.
3) The group membership(s) is maintained and stored
by the Capability Manager. It maintains a database
and ensures dynamic update of the file containing
group membership information.
4) Each client is registered to a specific Service Man-
ager that ensures security and access rights, and acts
as the communicator between user client and service
client.
Other jobs of Service Managers are to provide a list
of services, and to send updated messages to all regis-
tered clients when a state is changed, etc. This project
facilitates users with the access right of services in other
domains by establishing a bridge between the root Service
Managers of different networks. The researchers are now
working to provide dynamic access rights rather than in-
corporating static access rights where a user will be able
to access a service for which he does not have access
rights through other granted users under certain condi-
tions. The project has been implemented using Java and
XML.
6 Trust
Trust is inseparably related to every aspect of authenti-
cation and authorization, and can be considered another
face of the security coin. Several trust models have been
defined starting from the middle of the last decade. Ab-
dul Rahman and Hailes [48] introduced the notion ‘dis-
tributed trust model’ in 1998. Here each node has to
maintain a storage of the trust value of other devices
where the trust value spreads over -1 (complete distrust)
to 4 (complete trust). Using master/slave pairing, Sta-
jano [55] proposed a hierarchical model for trust requiring
pre-configuration known as Resurrecting Duckling Model.
In 2004 researches proposed a distributed trust model [47]
based on an ‘effort/return’ mechanism. Upon introduc-
ing agents in the nodes that are responsible for collecting
necessary information, it focuses on direct monitoring and
devaluation of perceived trust for malicious devices. Here
the trust value ranges from -1 to 1 and this model specif-
ically deals with ‘pure’ ad hoc scenarios. The reputed
game theory and distributed algorithm are the pillars of
the trust model proposed by Sun [56]. Another example
of a decentralized trust management model is ‘PTM’ [3]
which provides data exchange features based on a recom-
mendation protocol. Here each node is responsible for
its personal security and maintains a chart that includes
the identity of trusted and distrusted nodes, correspond-
ing trust values, and other related information. The total
trust formation and evolution contains two phases known
as ‘Belief Space’ and ‘Evidence Space’.
Very recently two researchers from Imperial College,
London, proposed a dynamic model [31] for determining
the trustworthiness of a context provider. Each Context
Provider (CP) registers with the Service Directory (SD)
and describes the attributes of the contexts according to
their capabilities. When an application requires a specific
context, it passes that query with a utility function to
the SD; a value is then determined for that function by
inputting the described attributes and trust value of a
CP that can provide the required contextual information.
This process is continued for all the CPs capable of serving
that specific context. The CP with highest utility value
achieves the responsibility of providing the context value.
The trust value of a CP is a dynamically calculated value
based on the binary feedbacks of other consumers of that
service, and a value is generated by cross checking with
other CPs that provide the same service. A Bayesian
probability density function is used to calculate the trust
value by taking the above stated facts as input. In order
to calculate trust dynamically only the last n feedback
values are used.
Researchers in [71] present a trust model which can
perform in both ‘pure’ and ‘managed’ pervasive environ-
ment network structure with equal efficiency. This model
identifies some essential attributes including absence of
central authority and pre- configuration, distributed na-
ture, miniature footprint, flexibility to customization, dy-
namic recalculation of trust value, etc. Based on some
specific criterions, nodes have been classified into man-
agerial nodes, independent nodes, and dependent nodes.
The architecture encompassed the following main compo-
nents:
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1) User interface which is used by the administrator for
customization.
2) rValue (Recommendation Value) Manager deals with
the recommendation values.
3) Request/Response Handler handles query request
and response.
4) Application Request Handler is responsible for han-
dling queries about trust initiated by pervasive ap-
plications.
5) Trust Calculation handles the overall manipulation
of trust.
Based on monitored data, recommendation values and
recommenders’ rValue, an overall trust value is calculated
which has the range from -1 (complete distrust) to 1 (com-
plete trust). This trust value calculation is performed pe-
riodically to ensure dynamicity. The framework has been
implemented using C# and Compact .NET framework.
As part of SSRD (Simple and Secure Resource Dis-
covery) researchers proposed a trust model [54]. Here a
trust value of 1.0 represents complete trustworthiness and
0.0 represents complete untrustworthiness. A new node
with no prior history of interaction receives a trust value
of .5 indicating neither trust nor distrust. Here the at-
tribute trust is service dependent and has the properties
of reflexivity and transitivity. Each owner or manager of a
device retains a table which indicates the security level re-
quired by each of the available services. The security level
required by a service varies from 1 to 10. The resource
managers also conserve another list named ‘Service-trust’,
which describes the trust related to each available service
for all the neighboring nodes. Whenever a request for
service is received, this table is used as a look up table.
Risk is an important factor that we need to charac-
terize in maintaining security. This is especially critical
for the scenario when a decision has to be made about
granting a privilege to an unknown entity who does not
have proper recommendation; the associated probable
risk needs to be calculated. Here risk has been consid-
ered as the probability that an interaction will lead to
a catastrophic situation. This paper [12] has proposed
a risk assessment model which will be embedded in the
SECURE framework [10]. A general risk assessment for-
mula R = F (x1, x2, x3, . . . , xm) + Z has been used where
R is the probability of risk x1, x2, x3, . . . , xm denotes the
components of feature vector, and Z is the random dis-
turbance factor. The risk estimator first extracts fea-
tures which are then clustered and the Average Loss Rate
(ALR) is calculated. Mahalanobis distance is used in for-
mulating the similarity between vectors. Later we find
the Risk Probability (RP) of an interaction. This model
differs from other static models because it has the capa-
bility to dynamically calculate the risk factor for a new
interaction.
7 Open Issues
In the pervasive computing environment, we need a se-
curity policy that will simultaneously be an unobtrusive
mechanism to the user as well as have the ability to dis-
cover the services available for the user in a transparent
manner. The system needs a dynamic security policy
which is flexible enough to update and modify on the
fly. Both the user and the system need a secure access
control and authorization mechanism that will act as a
middleman and negotiate with both the parties to find a
best possible service within the limitations imposed by
both the participants. The augmentation of contexts in
access control is enhancing the static security features
towards dynamic security.
Heterogeneity
Due to the distributed and ad hoc nature of the
pervasive computing environment, this system is open
to several unique vulnerabilities and suffers from quite a
number of well-known problems whose reputed solutions
are not applicable here. Along with this, the capability
of pervasive devices varies widely in terms of memory
storage, battery power, computational capability, etc.
For example, a RFID tag contains some hundred bits of
information where as a latest PDA has the speed up to
400 MHz with 80 GB memory capacity. Again pervasive
devices can appear from different domains with differing
topologies, thus creating a thorny heterogeneous scenario
which involves a complete unique set of vulnerability
and susceptibility. Again as this scenario is facilitated
by mobility of the user, a device can frequently change
its domain thus moving from one network topology to
other. There is no central administrative backbone that
can provide the required characteristics of security with
responsibility. As a result, the only option left is to make
the small, tiny pervasive devices more responsible for
their own security. But the burden of the security fea-
tures may be too large for them due to their limitations
in battery power, memory storage and computational
capability. In a recent paper [49] author mentioned five
obstacles in security and included barriers like privacy
and trustworthiness of the devices as security issues.
Location detection
In this surrounding and because the number of devices
can be really huge, it is very difficult to detect the
physical device with which I am interacting. For this we
need a secure communication channel along with device
authentication. Again the request for establishing this
trust channel is flowing through the shared, unreliable
wireless channel. As an approach to solve this problem,
the author in [49] has mentioned GPS and other location
tracking systems for detecting the precise location of the
interacting device. But we know that GPS doesn’t work
inside buildings and a feasible location tracking system
which is applicable for tiny pervasive devices is still in the
phase of research. A researcher from MIT has shown [70]
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the utility of using the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN)
algorithm [28, 29] in the authentication mechanism of
RFID where RFID was taken as a representative of tiny
pervasive computing devices.
Access control
In case of access control, the system is based on the
role and identity of the user. Again this privilege of
accessing system resources and services is a variable
which depends on the time, situation and other con-
textual information. Here the user needs to trust the
pervasive computing environment including the resources
and services available. At the same time the system
needs to ensure the identity and access rights of the
user. Though several access control mechanisms have
been developed for several specific scenarios, we need
a common framework which works in all scenarios with
equal efficiency.
Privacy
In case of privacy two issues come up with equal pri-
ority:
1) Is privacy of the user being maintained?
2) Is privacy of the data being maintained?
Unlike distributed computing, pervasive computing
likes to take user information and consider it as important
contextual information. Though this contextual informa-
tion plays a vital role in updating the system dynamically,
it sometimes poses serious threat to the privacy of the
user, especially in situations where people do not want to
disclose their identity or location.
In a research [42, 43, 52] in IMSS General Hospital,
Mexico the researchers formulated an ad hoc contextual
information based hospital system which was very useful
from the perspective of doctors, nurses, resident doctors
and other medical staffs within the boundary of the
hospital. But the availability of user information and
displaying information in public created a negative
impact on some users. As a result, the researchers
had to make some changes in the design and put
abstraction in the private information [22, 58, 59]. In
Castro Valley, California, nurses of the medical center
refused to incorporate the location tracking system as
they believed that this would hamper their privacy
[51]. As part of the famous Gaia project, developers
have shown a privacy preserving hop by hop routing
methodology [48] that carries information about the
residing place of the user but it does not reveal the exact
location or identity of the user. From these projects it
is very evident that the privacy level and willingness
of disclosure of personal information varies depending
on information type, collection method, time and other
concerns. In some scenarios users are reluctant to disclose
identity information but don’t care much about location
information. The situation might be reversed for some
others, and there are scenarios where users are reluctant
to reveal both. An intelligent system which can identify
these issues and can dynamically adopt a mechanism in
relation with other contextual variables can be a project
of attention.
Data communication
Privacy of the data encompasses two aspects. First, it
has to ensure that data being shared or communicated is
not being hacked by any active or passive eavesdroppers.
As an initial thought, we consider several encryption and
decryption techniques. But simultaneously we need to
think about the other side of the coin which reminds us
about the memory, battery power and other limitations.
Along with that, the users in pervasive computing en-
vironment have much more flexibility and independence
in mobility. This includes a large variety of domains
ranging from well secured environments to totally open
unsecured situations which makes the data security issue
worse. Secondly, how can it be guaranteed that the
user data which is being collected almost transparently
will not be used maliciously? Or how we can ensure
with certainty that the sophisticated data is not being
manipulated by any unauthorized user?
Trust
In order to overcome several constraints, mutual
cooperation, interconnectedness and inter dependability
have been exposed as the obvious characteristics of
pervasive computing environment. Along with these
occurs the issue of trust. If data is shared with an
unwarranted device, the probability of data security
reduces automatically. Several trust models have been
developed addressing various issues of trust [3, 47, 55].
Again, what should be the exact criteria for proving
trust? This is one of the questions yet to be resolved.
Feedback
One of the characteristics of pervasive security is to
minimize interaction with the user. As a result, the in-
formation being collected about the user remains almost
transparent from users’ point of view. In order to increase
psychological satisfaction for the user, feedback can play
a vital role. It will inform the user about the manipula-
tion of the data and to whom and how it will be used.
On one hand we need to minimize user involvement in
security assurance mechanisms; on the other, pervasive
devices are needed to be fed by several contextual infor-
mation including location, identity, situation, time, etc.,
where in some cases user involvement is needed. The is-
sue of balancing security with user interaction is always
there.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented the current status of
pervasive security area. The feedback model presented
in the access control section is going to motivate many
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researchers as this is the first model in this issue, to the
best of our knowledge. Risk is another issue that is insep-
arably related with trust, though it is not a heavily dis-
cussed issue in pervasive computing. This factor can play
an important role in defining threshold values in trust. A
discussion of this kind has been placed in the trust sec-
tion. Overall, we tried to provide a complete summary
of pervasive security with some diversified recent research
and open issues. As a pervasive computing environment
can come in different formats such as static (e.g. sensor
network) or mobile (MANET), and pure (where adminis-
trator has no prior information about the ad hoc network)
or managed (where administrator has some prior knowl-
edge about the network), the security requirements also
take different shapes. Combining all these concerns, secu-
rity in pervasive computing has become a most complex
issue. These concerns have to be resolved in every aspect
to ensure this latest computing technology will flourish.
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